“No Comment”or
“Anything Goes”
A retrospective view on the
regulation of public commentary by lawyers
By Professor Lonnie T. Brown Jr.

Editor’s Note: This essay is based on a presentation Professor Lonnie
Brown made at the 2008 Ethics Centennial Symposium sponsored by
the American Bar Association’s Section of Litigation. The symposium
was in honor of the 100-year anniversary of the ABA’s 1908 Canons of
Professional Ethics. Brown is deeply appreciative of 2008 Georgia Law
alumna Kerrie Howze’s invaluable research assistance on this project.
he practice of litigators
making impassioned
public statements about
their clients and cases
has become almost
a routine or expected part of
any remotely high-profile matter. This is particularly so in
the context of criminal
prosecutions.
Defense attorneys
and prosecutors alike
seem to relish the
opportunity to posture and pontificate before the court
of public opinion, issuing soundbites that might very well
elicit a stern rebuke if uttered in the actual courtroom.
Here are a few noteworthy examples on the prosecution
side.
First, Wayne County, Mich., District Attorney Kym
Worthy made the following statement in support of her
decision to indict former Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick
on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice in relation
to his alleged cover-up of an affair with his former chief of
staff: “Our investigation has clearly shown that public doldol
lars were used, people’s lives were ruined, the justice system
was severely mocked and the public trust trampled on. …
This is as far from being a private matter as one can get.”1
In addition, in reference to Kilpatrick’s perjury charge,
Worthy stated: “Even children know that lying is wrong. ...
Lying (in court under oath) cannot be tolerated even if a
judge and jury see through it.”2
Another recent public statement of note was made by
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District of Columbia U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Taylor regarding the conclusion of the investigation into the deadly 2001 anthrax mailings.
Shortly after the death of principal suspect Dr. Bruce E. Ivins,
Taylor confidently proclaimed Ivins’ guilt – “We stand here today,
firmly convinced that we have the person who committed those
attacks. … And we are confident that, had this gone to trial, we
would have proved him [Ivins] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”3
While Taylor carefully emphasized what he deemed to be
extraordinary circumstances justifying the public disclosure of
evidence regarding an uncharged suspect,4 statements such as his
and Worthy’s have become increasingly common in high-profile
prosecutions.5
Not even renowned Chicago federal prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald
could resist the urge to editorialize in announcing the government’s
criminal complaint against former Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich,
sharply observing that “[Blagojevich’s] conduct would make Lincoln
roll over in his grave.”6
While prosecutors are certainly not alone in
their penchant for the soapbox, their unique
position within our judicial system as socalled “ministers of justice”7 makes their
extrajudicial commentary potentially
more problematic, particularly in light
of a criminal
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defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.
Nevertheless, within the context uttered, none of the aforementioned examples arguably ran afoul of the current Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. This, however, plainly would not have been
the case 100 years ago. At that time, extrajudicial advocacy of this
sort would have provoked widespread condemnation from members
of the bar because the appropriate response by a lawyer to a media
inquiry was, simply put, “no comment.”8
Specifically, the American Bar Association’s first codification
of ethical precepts for lawyers – the 1908 Canons of Professional
Ethics9 – included a rigid proscription concerning public commentary by attorneys in Canon 20:
“Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated
litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise
prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are to be
condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a
condemned
statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously.
An ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation
from the records and papers on file in the court; but even in extreme
cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement
statement.”10
While this canon, like the others, was largely aspirational, lack
lacking any meaningful regulatory bite,11 it still sent the unmistakable
message that posturing before the court of public opinion was an
unseemly practice that lawyers should avoid.
In the intervening 100 years an awful lot has obviously changed
in terms of the bar’s articulated attitude towards extrajudicial commentary. The profession has evolved from a regulatory culture of “no
comment” to one of “anything goes,” or at least “almost anything
goes.”
Though there are admittedly ethical restrictions concerning this
type of conduct, they are ambiguous, readily evaded and infrequently enforced.
Under the ABA’s current Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
to which most states adhere in substantial part, Canon 20 has been
replaced with two separate rules – Rules 3.6 and 3.8(f).
Rule 3.6(a) provides that: “A lawyer
who is participating or has participated in the investigation or
litigation of a matter shall not

make [a publicly disseminated] extrajudicial statement that the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know will … have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the
matter.”12
Although, the “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding” standard has been held constitutional by
the Supreme Court,13 it remains a somewhat vague and indefinite
measure. As a result, it is likely to ensnare only those whose communications are particularly outlandish and central to a case.14
Furthermore, the difficulty of establishing “material prejudice” in
this context is well-documented.
In Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart
Stuart,15 for example, the Supreme
Court found that “even pervasive, adverse [pretrial] publicity does
not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.”16 Hence, it is extraordinarily
challenging to predict that a particular communication is “substantially likely” to cause “material prejudice,” and therefore, similarly
arduous for disciplinary counsel to prove that an attorney issued a
public comment with the requisite scienter.17
To compound the potential regulatory problem created by its
blurry governing standard, Rule 3.6 also carves out a number of safe
harbors for extrajudicial comment.
Among the most significant is the exception for commentary
regarding “information contained in a public record,”18 which frees
lawyers to comment quite broadly on matters.
Another expansive loophole is the so-called “right of reply.”19
This provision expressly permits public statements that “a reasonable
lawyer would believe [to be] required to protect a client from the
substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated
by the lawyer or the lawyer’s client.”20
While counsel is cautioned by the rule to exercise restraint in
responding to adverse publicity,21 the “right of reply” creates the
opportunity for a great deal of extrajudicial commentary.22 When
combined with the provision allowing statements concerning
“information contained in a public record,”23 there really seems to
be little that attorneys cannot say.
Indeed, even if their comments might otherwise contravene
the malleable “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding” standard, lawyers may still be permitted to
comment extrajudicially under these sub-sections.24
The other trial publicity rule – Rule 3.8(f) – is restricted to
prosecutors, but is only intended to supplement Rule 3.6, not supsup
plant it.25
Hence, for the most part, the propriety of prosecutorial
commentary about cases remains contingent upon whethwheth
er or not the communication runs afoul of the pliable
dictates of Model Rule 3.626 – i.e., whether the prosecutor
knew or reasonably should have known the communicacommunica
tion “[would] have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.”27
This point is underscored by the ephemeral character
of the purported “heightened” standard that Rule 3.8(f)
imposes on prosecutors.
In particular, the general prohibition on prosecutors
under the rule is with regard to “extrajudicial comments
that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public
condemnation of the accused.”28 What qualifies as
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“public condemnation” and the requisite “heightening” thereof is
by no means clear.
If the public is sufficiently outraged over the heinous nature of
an alleged offense, for example, it seems unrealistic to attempt to
measure whether prosecutorial commentary has somehow increased
the magnitude of communal indignation concerning the accused. It
is akin to trying to determine who is “more dead” as between two
deceased individuals.
To make matters worse from a regulatory standpoint, there are
two broad areas of comment that are exempt under Rule 3.8(f),
even if the statements are somehow deemed to have “heighten[ed]
public condemnation of the accused.”
First, the provision excepts from its proscription those “statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and
extent of the prosecutor’s action.”
This window of permissible comment seems to afford prosecutors significant room to communicate with the public.
For instance, District Attorney Kym Worthy’s statements regarding Kwame Kilpatrick’s perjury and obstruction of justice charges,
noted earlier,29 could be explained as necessary to enlighten the
public as to the justification for prosecuting him for what some
characterized as a private affair.
The second exception to the Rule 3.8(f) standard is even more
pliant than the first. It seems to permit any prosecutorial statement,
no matter how inflammatory, that “serve[s] a legitimate law enforcement purpose.”30
One broad justification for communicating in this manner
might be to keep the public adequately informed about the status of
a case, an explanation that seems to cover comments such as those
issued by U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Taylor with respect to the investigation of the 2001 anthrax matter.
In fact, it is difficult to imagine a prosecutorial statement concerning any investigation or pending matter that could not somehow be justified or rationalized under this exception.
Moreover, besides Rule 3.8(f)’s ambiguous standard and gaping
exceptions, it is further emasculated by Rule 3.6’s safe harbors and
loopholes which appear to apply with equal force to prosecutors.31
In short, there is considerable wiggle room within the ethical
rules for both defense attorneys and prosecutors, thus facilitating the
proliferation and escalation of extrajudicial advocacy.
But, “Why (some may ask) is this a bad thing?” Maybe the rule
drafters got it right by allowing for greater public commentary by
lawyers.
After all, it can serve to educate or protect the public, in addition
to being a powerful adversarial tool in a litigator’s arsenal.
Furthermore, courts have the ability to rein in some of this
behavior through the imposition of gag orders if deemed necessary.
Be that as it may, the expanding prevalence of bold, extrajudicial
proclamations by lawyers on such points as the inevitability of conviction or acquittal have the potential to irreparably skew the public’s perception of the profession and the justice system as a whole.
Indeed, the quantity and nature of this sort of attorney speech is
enough to inspire nostalgic yearning for a return to the days of “no
comment,” when lawyers tried their cases in the courtroom rather
than on the courthouse steps.
Unfortunately, in current times, “no comment” is synonymous
4
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High-profile cases, such as the one against former Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich, often
result in attorneys taking their advocacy to the court of public opinion. Photo courtesy of
The Washington Times.

with an admission or concession as to whatever negative conclusion
a listener can draw. In addition, there are certainly situations where
some manner of extrajudicial comment is undeniably proper, and
conceivably even required.
Although resurrecting the “no comment” standard of old would
be impractical, the same cannot be said about the lofty goals and
principles that ostensibly inspired this norm and others more than
100 years ago.
In enacting the canons, the ABA’s articulated objective was the
cultivation of a system that was “pure and unsullied” through the
exhibition of professional conduct and motives that would generate “absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality” of the
administration of justice, and ultimately enhance the overall image
and reputation of the profession.32
www.law.uga.edu
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Unfortunately, in current times, “no comment” is synonymous with
an admission or concession as to whatever negative conclusion a listener can
draw. In addition, there are certainly situations where some manner of
extrajudicial comment is undeniably proper, and conceivably even required.

The questionable behavior of many modern day extrajudicial
advocates tends to have quite the opposite effect. Consequently,
these lawyers must be compelled to chin to a higher standard, one
more consistent with the proffered intent behind the 1908 Canons.
Proper areas for attorney commentary should accordingly be recrafted with such first principles in mind.
Along these lines, one possibility might be to permit only statements intended to: (1) assist in the maintenance of public accountability with regard to the legal system;
(2) protect the public from potential harm; or (3) educate the public
about the substance and procedure of legal proceedings.
Textual support for limiting permissible public comment in this
fashion can be found in Comment 1 to Model Rule 3.6, where it
is noted that:
“[T]here are vital social interests served by the free dissemination
of information about events having legal consequences and about
legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about
threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It
also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings,
particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the
subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in
debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.”33
This unenforceable comment, which is largely overshadowed by
the ambiguities and loopholes of Rule 3.6’s blackletter text, hearkens
back to the public-oriented ideals associated with the original ABA
Canons and should be accorded greater regulatory emphasis.
There are undoubtedly other viable responses to the burgeoning
practice of lawyers commenting publicly on pending matters. The
critical point is that something needs to be done, and perhaps a
retrospective view can provide the appropriate ethical lens through
which to examine the problem.
Concededly, in order to effectuate positive change and achieve
progress, it is frequently necessary to discard or discredit seemingly
archaic ideals or modes of operation. But just because something
may be categorized as old does not automatically qualify it as obsolete.
A forward-looking view is not always the right perspective; as the
saying goes, hindsight is 20/20.
From my vantage point, on the subject of extrajudicial speech
by lawyers, a thoughtful look backwards could very well foster an
ethical step in the right direction.
www.law.uga.edu
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